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INFO: ARA (06) PPC (01) ECP (01) OAS (01) PPA (01) LARA (01)
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13/1118Z A2 RD (TOTAL COPIES: 025)

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-- THEY HAD A GOOD AND WORTHWHILE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND
RECORDED CONCRETE AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS ON
SEVERAL QUESTIONS.

ORIGIN EUR-00

SOVIET INTERNAL SITUATION

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-00 OIC-02 AF-00 H-01
IO-19 NEA-00 ARA-00 NSAE-00 SSD-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-00 EAP-00 PA-01 MRRG-00 INM-00 INRE-00
DES-09 ACDA-13 USIE-00 SP-00 PRS-01 DS-00 SCT-03
P-02 T-01 SB-00 /099 R

O THE MINISTERIAL FOLLOWED AN IMPORTANT EVENT IN
SOVIET POLITICAL LIFE: THE FEBRUARY 5-7 CENTRAL
COMMITTEE PLENUM.

DRAFTED BY: EUR/SOV: SPIFER/AWOLFF:AR
APPROVED BY: EUR:CKAMMAN
EUR/SOV:JTEFFT P:KBRILL
S/S: JSROY S/S-O: JMUSSOMELI
-----133526 130530Z /18

-- THOUGH BESET BY DIFFICULT CHALLENGES -- A STUMBLING
ECONOMY, SEPARATISM IN THE BALTICS, SHARP INTERETHNIC
TENSIONS IN THE CAUCASUS -- GORBACHEV SEEMS DETERMINED TO
MOVE FORWARD WITH PERESTROYKA AND INTRODUCE A NEW
DYNAMISM INTO SOVIET POLITICAL LIFE.

O P 130400Z FEB 90 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM
INFO ALL POLADS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE 0000
CIA WASHDC 0000
SECDEF WASHDC 0000

O BOTH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE TOLD THE SECRETARY
THAT PERESTROYKA HAD REACHED A POINT REQUIRING DECISIVE
ACTION, AND THEY INDICATED THAT THE PLENUM WOULD BE THE
START OF A NEW PUSH TO RADICALIZE THE REFORM PROCESS.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON U.S.-SOVIET MINISTERIAL

ARMS CONTROL

O THE MINISTERS, ASSISTED BY EXPERTS, HAD AN EXTENSIVE
EXCHANGE ON THE FULL SPECTRUM OF ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS.

REF: (A) STATE 46079
(B) STATE 46017

O IN TWO DAYS OF VIRTUALLY ROUND-THE-CLOCK
NEGOTIATIONS, WE WERE ABLE TO RESOLVE OR CLOSE WITHIN ONE
OR TWO ISSUES ON SUCH MAJOR START ISSUES AS ALCMS, SLCMS,
AND NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES.

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

O THE SECRETARY TOOK TO MOSCOW A PACKAGE ON ALCMS THAT
INVOLVED A NUMBER OF RESPONSES TO SOVIET CONCERNS.

2. ALL ADDRESSEES -- EXCEPT NATO POSTS, CANBERRA, SEOUL
AND TOKYO (WHICH SHOULD USE SEPTEL TALKING POINTS) -- MAY
DRAW ON POINTS IN PARA 3 AS APPROPRIATE TO BRIEF HOST
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ON FEBRUARY 7-9 MOSCOW MINISTERIAL.
ADDRESSEES MAY ALSO DRAW ON JOINT STATEMENT (REF A) AND
JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (REF B).

-- FOR COUNTING ALCMS WITHIN THE 6000 LIMIT, OUR
PREVIOUS POSITION WOULD HAVE ATTRIBUTED TEN TO EACH
BOMBER EQUIPPED TO CARRY ALCMS. IN MOSCOW WE PROPOSED A
DIFFERENTIATED COUNTING RULE UNDER WHICH B-52S, B-1S AND
FUTURE BOMBERS EQUIPPED TO CARRY ALCMS WOULD BE ATTRIBUTED
WITH TEN, WHILE TU-95 BEAR H AND TU-160 BLACKJACK BOMBERS
EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS WOULD BE ATTRIBUTED WITH EIGHT.

3. BEGIN TEXT MINISTERIAL TALKING POINTS:

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO AGREE
THAT NO BOMBER MAY BE CONFIGURED TO CARRY MORE THAN TEN
AS MANY ALCMS AS THE NUMBER ATTRIBUTED TO IT. FOR
EXAMPLE, THE B-52 COULD CARRY NO MORE THAN 20. THIS
WOULD BE VERIFIED BY ON-SITE INSPECTION AS THE SOVIETS
PROPOSED.

OVERVIEW

O WHEN PRESIDENT BUSH AND CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV MET IN
MALTA, THEY DEFINED CERTAIN GOALS AND PRIORITIES FOR
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, WITH A PARTICULAR VIEW TOWARD THE

-- AND WE PROPOSED TO MOVE ON THE RANGE THRESHOLD BY
LOWERING OUR PROPOSAL FROM 1500 TO 1000 KILOMETERS.

JUNE SUMMIT.

-- THE OVERARCHING AIM, IN THIS TIME OF TRANSFORMATION
IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, IS TO BUILD A MORE STABLE AND
COOPERATIVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

O IN TWO DAYS OF INTENSE NEGOTIATIONS, ALL ISSUES WERE
RESOLVED EXCEPT FOR THE RANGE THRESHOLD.

O THE MOSCOW MINISTERIAL WAS AN IMPORTANT AND USEFUL
STEP IN LAYING THE GROUND FOR A PRODUCTIVE MEETING
BETWEEN THE LEADERS IN JUNE.

O AS FOR SLCMS, WE GAVE THE SOVIETS A DRAFT OF THE
TYPE OF SLCM DECLARATION THAT WE HAVE IN MIND, UNDER
WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD ANNUALLY DECLARE ITS NUCLEAR SLCM
PLANS FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

O THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE
REVIEWED THE FULL AGENDA OF U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES.

-- THE SOVIETS, IN RETURN, GAVE US A SLCM DECLARATION
OF THEIR OWN. WE WERE THEN ABLE TO RESOLVE ALL ISSUES
EXCEPT FOR THE RANGE THRESHOLD AND THE QUESTION WHETHER
ONLY NUCLEAR OR BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SLCMS ARE
INCLUDED. THIS DECLARATORY APPROACH IS BASED ON A
POLITICALLY BINDING DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE VERIFICATION
PROVISIONS IN EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSALS THAT WE FELT WOULD

-- WHILE NOTING THAT SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON
CERTAIN ISSUES, THEY EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT THE
RELATIONSHIP IS INCREASINGLY MARKED BY UNDERSTANDING,
COOPERATION AND THE SEARCH FOR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

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-- THE SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS QUESTION IN GENEVA.

O ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES, WE ACCEPTED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES WOULD BE PERMITTED NEAR DEPLOYMENT AREAS ONLY IN AGREED VERY SMALL NUMBERS, WITH ALL OTHERS CONFINED TO DECLARED FACILITIES SOME DISTANCE AWAY.

-- AND WE AGREED THAT ADDITIONAL NUMERICAL LIMITS WOULD APPLY ONLY TO NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES OF TYPES FLIGHT-TESTED FROM MOBILE LAUNCHERS.

O THE SIDES ALSO REACHED AGREEMENT ON MAJOR ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND WITH RESPECT TO HANDLING DATA DENIAL UNDER THE START TREATY.

O WE ADVANCED NEW IDEAS ON OTHER START ISSUES AS WELL, INCLUDING ON MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION, TREATY DURATION AND PHASING OF REDUCTIONS.

O WHILE COMPLEX ISSUES REMAIN, WE ARE MOVING FORWARD TOWARD OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF HAVING THE SUBSTANTIVE START ISSUES RESOLVED BY THE JUNE SUMMIT.

O THE MINISTERS EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF DEFENSE AND SPACE.

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD BE INTRODUCING A NEW PROPOSAL REGARDING PREDICTABILITY MEASURES SHORTLY IN GENEVA.

-- THE SOVIETS REPEATED THEIR CALL FOR AN AGREED START STATEMENT THAT AN ABM TREATY VIOLATION WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM START. HOWEVER, IN AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT THAT CONFIRMS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DELINKED START FROM DEFENSE AND SPACE, THEY STATED THIS WAS A PREFERENCE -- NOT A PRECONDITION -- FOR A START ACCORD.

O ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE SECRETARY PROPOSED A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE U.S. AND USSR TO MOVE FORWARD ON MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL CW ARMS CONTROL.

O THE SOVIETS AGREED TO A GENERAL FRAMEWORK, WHICH WAS RECORDED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- THIS REPRESENTS A MAJOR STEP IN U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION ON CW ARMS CONTROL, AND SHOULD GIVE A MAJOR STIMULUS TO BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO REDUCE AND ELIMINATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE ARE MOVING FROM THE REALM OF WORDS TO ACTION.

O WE REVIEWED THE STATUS OF THE NUCLEAR TESTING TALKS, RESOLVED SEVERAL ISSUES, AND REAFFIRMED THE GOAL OF COMPLETING THE TTBT AND PNET VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS READY FOR SIGNING AT THE SUMMIT.

O ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE PLACE AMONG THE 23, THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED OUR RECENT INITIATIVES IN THE AREA OF MANPOWER AND AIRCRAFT (THIS WAS THE SAME DAY THAT THEY WERE BEING TABLED IN VIENNA).

-- HE MADE CLEAR THAT U.S. FORCE LEVELS WERE NOT LINKED TO SOVIET LEVELS, THAT 195,000 IN THE CENTRAL ZONE WAS A SUSTAINABLE LEVEL FOR THE U.S., AND THAT SOVIETS COULD WELL CHOOSE TO GO LOWER.

O GORBACHEV PRESENTED THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL, OFFERING A CHOICE OF 225,000 OR 195,000 U.S. AND SOVIET STATIONED FORCES, BUT MADE CLEAR THAT IN EITHER CASE THE LIMIT WOULD APPLY TO ALL OF EUROPE.

-- SHEVARDNADZE HAD EARLIER INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS NO LONGER INSISTED ON OVERALL NATO-WARSAW PACT MANPOWER LIMITS, AND THAT THEY WOULD DROP THEIR DEMAND FOR LIMITS ON OTHER ALLIES' STATIONED FORCES.

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS WE WOULD CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES ON OUR RESPONSE.

O ON AIRCRAFT, THE SOVIETS AGREED TO INCLUDE MEDIUM BOMBERS (TU-22, TU-22M, TU-16) BUT NOT LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT. IN A STEP AWAY FROM OUR NEW PROPOSAL, THEY ALSO PROPOSED:

-- A BASE OF 4700 COMBAT AIRCRAFT;

-- PLUS A SEPARATE CEILING OF 1500 INTERCEPTORS, WITHOUT FREEDOM TO MIX;

-- PLUS A SEPARATE CEILING OF 1500-1600 COMBAT-CAPABLE TRAINERS.

-- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT, THIS WOULD TOTAL MORE THAN 2000 MORE AIRCRAFT THAN NATO NOW HAS.

-- WE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WAS COMPLETELY OUT OF THE QUESTION.

O THE SECRETARY NOTED THE UTILITY OF AN OPEN SKIES REGIME AND URGED SHEVARDNADZE TO WORK TO MAKE THE OTTAWA CONFERENCE A SUCCESS.

-- HE BRIEFLY DESCRIBED THE RATIONALE FOR THE NATO APPROACH.

-- WE ALSO NOTED THE HUNGARIAN DESIRE TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT READY FOR SIGNING THIS SPRING. WE THINK THIS IS POSSIBLE, BUT AT THE OUTSIDE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A TREATY READY FOR SIGNATURE IN THE FALL.

O THE SIDES DISCUSSED NON-PROLIFERATION QUESTIONS AND AGREED TO PREPARE FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE LEADERS A STATEMENT ON PRINCIPLES AND CONCRETE STEPS TO CONTROL CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

O ON THE QUESTION OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL, THE SOVIETS, IN AN IMPORTANT NEW DEVELOPMENT, INFORMED US OF THEIR READINESS TO ADHERE TO THE GUIDELINES OF THE MTCR, SOMETHING WE HAD LONG SOUGHT.

REGIONAL ISSUES

O REGIONAL ISSUES AGAIN FIGURED PROMINENTLY DURING THE SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE.

O THE SECRETARY UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHED TO PROGRESS ACROSS THE BOARD ON REGIONAL ISSUES AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON KEY ISSUES.

O THE TOP ISSUE FOR THE SOVIETS REMAINS AFGHANISTAN.

O THE SECRETARY LAID OUT A DETAILED THREE-PHASE PLAN

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INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TOWARD A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ALL AFGHANS AND COMPATIBLE WITH OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN REGIONAL STABILITY. THIS PROPOSAL REPRESENTS A DEVELOPMENT OF PREVIOUS U.S. IDEAS, AND AN EFFORT TO TRY TO DEFINE AT LEAST FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES HOW A TRANSITION PROCESS MIGHT UNFOLD.

-- THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE PLAN ARE AIMED AT PROMOTING THE PROSPECT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOVERNMENT THAT IS BROAD-BASED, NON-ALIGNED AND AT PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

-- AN ESSENTIAL RESULT OF THIS PROCESS, HOWEVER, REMAINS THE DEPARTURE OF NAJIBULLAH AND HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES AT SOME POINT IN THE TRANSITION; OTHERWISE, THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANY GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION OR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT REMAINS REMOTE.

-- ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO REJECT THE NOTION THAT NAJIBULLAH'S PRESENCE REMAINS A REAL OBSTACLE TO PEACE, THEY UNDERTOOK TO EXPLORE THE U.S. PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL THROUGH EXPERTS TALKS IN THE WEEKS AHEAD.

O SHEVARDNADZE EMPHASIZED NAJIBULLAH'S RECENT ELECTION PROPOSAL AS A BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT.

-- THE SOVIETS ALSO REITERATED A NUMBER OF OLD IDEAS ABOUT HOW TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD AND PROPOSED A JOINT EFFORT WHEREBY THE U.S. AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS COULD BETTER INFORM THEMSELVES ABOUT THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- THE U.S. AGREED TO DISCUSS THE IDEA AT THE NEXT EXPERTS TALKS.

O THE SECRETARY RAISED THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHED TO PROGRESS IN THIS REGION. HE EMPHASIZED THE U.S. DESIRE TO SEE DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS TAKE ROOT IN THE REGION.

-- IN THIS REGARD, HE HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA AND THEIR RELATION TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION. THE SOVIETS SAID THEY AGREED WITH BOTH THESE POINTS.

-- BOTH SIDES PLEDGED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE OUTCOME OF A FREE AND FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS.

O THE SOVIETS WERE CRITICAL OF THE U.S. ACTION IN PANAMA AND SECRETARY BAKER EXPLAINED THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE U.S. INVASION. HE REAFFIRMED U.S. INTENTION TO REMOVE ALL REMAINING TROOPS INTRODUCED INTO PANAMA SINCE LAST DECEMBER BY THE END OF THE MONTH. AND HE SUGGESTED THE SOVIETS SEND A FIVE-PERSON SUPREME SOVIET DELEGATION TO PANAMA TO SEE FOR THEMSELVES HOW PANAMA HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED.

O ON EL SALVADOR, THE SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FMLN.

-- THE U.S. EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF ARMS REACHING THE FMLN FROM CUBA AND NICARAGUA.

-- SECRETARY BAKER HIGHLIGHTED, AND MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AGREED WITH, THE NEED FOR ALL OUTSIDE

SUPPORT TO THE FMLN TO STOP IMMEDIATELY IN ORDER TO PROMOTE A LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

O ~~THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED U.S. CONCERN OVER RECENT MILITARY SHIPMENTS TO THE REGION, INCLUDING MIG-29 AIRCRAFT TO CUBA, WHICH WE DO NOT BELIEVE ARE CONDUCTIVE TO EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS IN THE REGION.~~

-- ~~SHEVARDNADZE SOUGHT TO DOWNPLAY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE DELIVERIES AND URGED THE U.S. TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CUBA.~~

O SECRETARY BAKER SAID HE WANTED TO RAISE ASIA SINCE WE HAD NOT HAD THE TIME TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE IN MALTA.

O THE DISCUSSION ON ASIA INCLUDED USEFUL EXCHANGES ON THE SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE REGION; THE U.S. URGED THAT THE GENERAL EASING OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS NOT BYPASS THE ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION.

O THE SECRETARY POINTED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVED SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND URGED MOSCOW TO TAKE STEPS TO RESOLVE THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE WITH JAPAN -- AN ITEM WHICH REMAINS A STUMBLING BLOCK IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

-- HE SAID THE U.S. AGREED WITH JAPAN ON THIS ISSUE AND BELIEVED THAT RESOLUTION OF THE MATTER WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO LESSENER TENSIONS IN THE REGION AT LARGE.

-- ALTHOUGH SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN "NORMALIZING" RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, HE WAS UNWILLING TO ADDRESS DIRECTLY THE ISSUE, ARGUING THAT THIS WAS A BILATERAL MATTER BETWEEN MOSCOW AND TOKYO AND THAT 98 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE OPPOSED RETURNING THE ISLANDS.

O THE SIDES REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND AGREED ON THE NEED TO REDUCE TENSIONS THERE. BOTH SIDES AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT NORTH KOREA SIGN A NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT -- EVEN IF MOSCOW REMAINS SENSITIVE ABOUT PUBLIC CALLS TO THIS EFFECT.

-- SHEVARDNADZE DOWNPLAYED THE THREAT TO THE ROK FROM THE NORTH AND SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD WELCOME A REDUCTION OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTH KOREA. HE DREW

ATTENTION TO NORTH KOREA'S PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE SOUTH.

-- THE SECRETARY DISAGREED WITH THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT. HE POINTED TO THE MILITARY IMBALANCE GREATLY FAVORING THE NORTH, WHILE EMPHASIZING OUR SUPPORT FOR A NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

O ON CAMBODIA, THE U.S. URGED THE USSR TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE HUN SEN REGIME TO HELP CREATE A NEUTRAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH A TRANSITION PROCESS WITH AN ENHANCED UN ROLE COULD OCCUR.

-- THE SOVIETS REVEALED THAT THEY MAY SOON MEET WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK AND URGED THE U.S. TO ESTABLISH DIRECT CONTACTS WITH HUN SEN.

O DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST FOCUSED ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE REGION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE.

THE U.S. SIDE DESCRIBED EFFORTS IT WAS TAKING TO

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PROMOTE SUCH A DIALOGUE AND URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESS BY RESTORING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND INCREASING OTHER FORMS OF CONTACT WITH ISRAEL.

SHOULD BE HANDLED IN A FRAMEWORK THAT TOOK APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS AND CONCERNS OF OTHER STATES.

-- THE SOVIETS LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO THE SECRETARY'S ARGUMENTS, BUT WERE NON-COMMITTAL IN RESPONSE.

O THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET EMIGRANTS TO ISRAEL IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRATIZATION

- THE SECRETARY AFFIRMED THE LONGSTANDING U.S. VIEW THAT ANY SUCH SETTLEMENTS WERE NOT CONDUCTIVE TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE U.S. NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT FEW SOVIET EMIGRANTS HAD, IN FACT, SETTLED IN THE TERRITORIES, AND WE SAW LITTLE PROSPECT OF CHANGE IN THIS REGARD.

O IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN OUR TRADITIONAL CONCERNS (SPECIFIC SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS) AND NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION INVOLVING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIETS REGARDING DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE RULE OF LAW AS WELL AS DIALOGUE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES.

O THE SIDES ALSO EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT AND THE TENSE SITUATION IN LEBANON.

O AMONG TRADITIONAL CONCERNS:

O WITH REGARD TO AFRICA, THE U.S. EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA WAS LAGGING BEHIND THAT IN NAMIBIA AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TO A LASTING SETTLEMENT BASED ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

-- WE KNOW OF NO REMAINING PURELY POLITICAL PRISONERS. WE DISCUSSED SOME DOUBTFUL CASES WITH THE SOVIETS. THERE ARE LESS THAN 30 LEFT IN THIS CATEGORY.

-- THE SOVIETS AGAIN SUGGESTED A MUTUAL CUTOFF OF U.S. AND SOVIET ARMS TO THE COMBATANTS.

-- WHILE ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY AS AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT PRACTICE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ENDED, WE RAISED THOSE REMAINING CASES OF INDIVIDUALS CONCERNING WHOM WE HAVE SOME QUESTIONS.

O AS TO THE SITUATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN ETHIOPIA, BUT CONTINUED TO DISAGREE ON THE ROLE SOVIET MILITARY AID TO MENGISTU PLAYS IN PROLONGING FIGHTING IN THAT COUNTRY.

-- WE URGED PASSAGE OF A NEW LAW ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.

-- IN VIEW OF THE GROWING THREAT OF FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA, THE SIDES UNDERTOOK TO CONTRIBUTE TO EFFORTS TO MINIMIZE THE RENEWED HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY FACING THE REGION.

-- RESTRICTIONS ON EMIGRATION CONTINUE TO BE RELAXED. WE REVIEWED THE APPROXIMATELY 60 CASES ON OUR LIST OF REFUSENIKS WHO HAVE BEEN DENIED ON SECURITY GROUNDS. THERE ARE PROBABLY HUNDREDS OF CASES OF DENIALS BASED ON THE ABSENCE OF PARENTAL CONSENT TO THE EMIGRATION OF ADULTS, BUT OUR SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS REPORTED THAT THE NEW EMIGRATION LAW, EXPECTED TO PASS WITHIN THE NEXT 60 DAYS, SHOULD HELP TO RESOLVE THESE CASES.

O THE SOVIETS AGAIN TRIED TO TAKE UP THE CYPRUS ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S.-SOVIET TALKS ON REGIONAL CONFLICTS. THE U.S. SIDE REITERATED ITS VIEW THAT THIS WAS NOT AN APPROPRIATE VENUE TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT AND URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO LEND ITS FULL AND UNDIVIDED SUPPORT TO THE EFFORTS OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO HELP RESOLVE THE CYPRUS QUESTION.

O WE URGED THE SOVIETS TO TAKE A FIRM STAND AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM AND TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF JEWISH CULTURE IN THE USSR.

EUROPE

O DURING THE MINISTERIAL WE DISCUSSED ARRANGEMENTS FOR A NUMBER OF COOPERATIVE AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS INTENDED TO ASSIST IN BUILDING A CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE RULE OF LAW.

O THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THE U.S. POSITION ON A CSCE SUMMIT: THAT IT SHOULD BE THE OCCASION FOR SIGNING A CFE AGREEMENT; THAT IT SHOULD BE PREPARATORY TO THE ALREADY-AGREED 1992 HELSINKI SUMMIT; AND THAT IT SHOULD HAVE AS ONE OF ITS OBJECTIVES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE ELECTIONS AS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT WITHIN THE HELSINKI PROCESS.

-- THERE WILL BE A SEMINAR IN MOSCOW IN MARCH FEATURING U.S. AND SOVIET LEGAL EXPERTS.

-- THE SOVIETS AGREED TO THE FIRST TWO OF THESE PRINCIPLES, BUT DID NOT REACT TO THE SECRETARY'S FREE ELECTIONS PROPOSAL.

-- AS PART OF AN ONGOING EXCHANGE STARTED LAST YEAR, A DELEGATION OF SOVIET PSYCHIATRISTS WILL VISIT THE UNITED STATES IN 1990.

O THE KEY EUROPEAN QUESTION OF CONCERN TO THE SOVIETS WAS, OF COURSE, GERMAN UNIFICATION.

-- WE ALSO HOPE TO PLACE SOME 50 SOVIET LAW STUDENTS INTO POST-GRADUATE PROGRAMS AT U.S. UNIVERSITIES.

-- THE SECRETARY MADE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. HAD SUPPORTED THE GOAL OF UNIFICATION FOR YEARS; THAT WE SUPPORTED A UNIFIED GERMANY WITHIN NATO, BUT THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO ENSURE THAT NATO'S MILITARY PRESENCE WOULD NOT EXTEND FURTHER EASTWARD; THAT WE BELIEVED THE INTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION WERE A MATTER FOR THE TWO GERMANY TO ADDRESS; AND THAT THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION

-- TEN SOVIET JUDGES WILL ATTEND JUDICIAL TRAINING COURSES IN THE UNITED STATES IN MAY.

-- OTHER PROGRAMS IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD, INCLUDING FOR THE HANDICAPPED AND WORKER SAFETY, ARE ALSO UNDER DISCUSSION.

O THE SOVIETS ASSURED US OF A NEW, COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THEY SAID THEY ARE PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE IT IN THE CSCE PROCESS AND THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.

TRANSNATIONAL MATTERS

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O TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED MAINLY IN THE WORKING-GROUP MEETINGS.

-- WE FOCUSED ON COUNTERTERRORISM, NARCOTICS AND ENVIRONMENT.

O ON COUNTERTERRORISM, WE FAVORABLY NOTED SOVIET CONDEMNATION OF THE FEBRUARY 4 TERRORIST ATTACK ON ISRAELI TOURISTS.

-- WE CALLED FOR SOVIET INFLUENCE ON SYRIA AND LIBYA TO CURTAIL TERRORIST MOVEMENTS.

O IN THE NARCOTICS DISCUSSIONS WE NOTED THAT SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE SINCE THE JANUARY 1989 MOU.

-- WE CALLED FOR SOVIET INFLUENCE AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING IN AFGANISTAN, BULGARIA, CUBA AND LAOS.

O ON THE ENVIRONMENT, THE SOVIETS PRIMARILY RESPONDED TO U.S. PROPOSALS MADE IN WYOMING;

-- THEY MADE CLEAR THEY WERE READY TO ESTABLISH A JOINT PARK IN THE BERING LAND BRIDGE AREA.

-- THEY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN STARTING POLLUTION STUDIES IN AGRICULTURAL RUN-OFF AREAS.

O WE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR EARLY PLANNING FOR THE 1992 UN CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT.

BILATERAL ISSUES

O OUR EMPHASIS ON THE BILATERAL SIDE HAS BEEN ON EXPANSION OF COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, FACILITATION OF PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS AND EASING OF LIVING/WORKING CONDITIONS FOR AMERICAN DIPLOMATS, EXCHANGEES, JOURNALISTS AND BUSINESSMEN.

O IN EXPANDING COOPERATION PROGRAMS, WE HAVE FOCUSED ON BASIC SCIENCES, HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT. WE CAREFULLY AVOID AREAS THAT INVOLVE DUAL-USE OR RESTRICTED TECHNOLOGIES.

-- THE SIDES AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE NEW AGREEMENTS READY FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT ON WORLD OCEANS, PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY, AND DEMARCATION OF THE U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY.

O WE ALSO HOPE TO CONCLUDE BY JUNE AN AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF U.S. AND SOVIETS CULTURAL CENTERS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON.

O THE U.S. URGED THE SOVIETS TO PROVIDE AN EARLY -- AND FAVORABLE -- REPLY TO THE "OPEN LANDS" INITIATIVE ADVANCED BY THE SECRETARY IN WYOMING TO ABOLISH CLOSED AREAS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS.

O AN EXTENSIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION WAS HELD ON THE QUESTIONS OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

O THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

O IN THIS REGARD, THEY POINTED OUT THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT THE INITIATIVES AGREED TO AT THE MALTA MEETING.

-- THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO CONCLUDING A COMMERCIAL TRADE AGREEMENT BY THE JUNE SUMMIT, CONSISTENT WITH PRESIDENT BUSH'S INITIATIVE AT MALTA.

-- THE U.S. SIDE ALSO REAFFIRMED ITS WILLINGNESS, ONCE A JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER IS IN PLACE, TO EXPLORE WITH THE CONGRESS REMOVING THE RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. GOVERNMENT CREDITS AND CREDIT GUARANTEES FOR BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION.

-- THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED SOME OF THE PROVISIONS OF AN INVESTMENT AGREEMENT.

-- THEY LOOKED FORWARD TO THE ONSET IN THE NEAR FUTURE OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN INVESTMENT AGREEMENT AND A TAX TREATY.

O THE SIDES ALSO REVIEWED THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A MARITIME TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT, AN EXPANDED CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT, AND A LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT.

O THE SIDES REVIEWED THE STATUS OF THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECTS THAT WERE PROPOSED AT THE MALTA MEETING AND THE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR.

O THEY ALSO DISCUSSED SOVIET OBSERVER STATUS IN THE GATT. THE U.S. SIDE REAFFIRMED ITS SUPPORT FOR SOVIET OBSERVER STATUS AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND, WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION AT THE END OF 1990.

O THE SIDES EXCHANGED VIEWS ON SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT BANK, AND THEY ALSO DISCUSSED THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET COOPERATION WITH THE OECD.

END TEXT TALKING POINTS. EAGLEBURGER

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